ted on in the hope that it might help sane
other children in the future.
So, it would
seem that you cannot lIDrally get there fran
here.

CONCERNING THERAPEUTIC
(FOR HUMANS) RESEARCH
WITH ANIMALS: A RESPONSE
TO NELSON'S "XENOGRAFT
AND PARTIAL AFFECTIONS"

The second argument intended to show
that parental partiality justifies xenograft
says that if you refuse to use the animal's
heart, it will cost the child's life but may
not save the animal's life.

STEVE F. SAPONTZ IS
IS�
California State University, Hayward
Hayward�

It is true that your decision not to use
an animal's heart probably will not save the
life of the an:i.rnal.
The animal in an organ
donor lab will die i f your child gets his/her
heart1
heart
1 he/she may not die otherwise, though
he/she probably will. But it is not true, as
the argument implies, that you are choosing
between a child's life and an animal's life.
The child will die i f he/she gets the ani
mal's heart, and he/she will die i f he/she
does not.

As Jim Nelson correctly and poignantly
indicates, even those who are deeply con
cerned about the moral respect due animals
and who are actively trying to eradicate the
hUlMIl abuse of animals can feel that they are
confronting a lIDral dilemma when confronting
uses of animals which seem obviously benefi
cial for the health and even the very life of
hUlMIls.
This is especially true when those
humans are, like children, dependent on t~em
for their care and well-being •
Any moral
theory which failed to recognize that there
is a morally significant difference between
such cases and cases where animals are ex
ploited for marginal or trivial purJ:X)ses-'-as
in rodeos, sport hunting, gourmet cooking,
and a great deal,
i f not all, psychological
research employing animals'--could justifiably
be considered doctrinaire.
Discovering what
ought to be done in such cases requires un
tying a tough knot, not slicing through it.
This is, I take it, what Nelson is about in
his paper.

The third argument is that death is a
greater hann to a child than to a baboon.
Once again, what is implied is that one is
making a choice between the child's life and
the babcx:m' s life which, as I have just
shown, is not the case. For that reason, any
assumptions about comparable worth are moot.
The fourth argument is this:
If a par
ent rejects xenograft, he/she has sacrificed
parental partiality to impartial reason, but
i f a parent accepts xenograft, he/she can
have it both ways, beCause he/she can exer
cise parental partiality through xenograft
and impartiality by individually pushing for
reform in medical research.

'!he cornerstone of Nelson's argument is
that parents are morally justified in giving
preference to their children over others.
I
\\Quld not disp.1te that1 I think that any
rroral theory which would have us deal with
all sentient beings on a thoroughly impar
tial, egalitarian basis is not only thorough
ly impractical but also unwarranted and unde
sirable.
However, as Nelson recognizes,
there are moral limits to what parents may do
for their children.
That one needed the
lIDney to pay for his/her child's education
would not justify his/her stealing and cash
ing a neighbor's winning lottery ticket. So,
further reasons, beyond parents' affection

This does not seem to me to be an argu
rrent to show that parental partiality justi
fies xenograft.
Rather, it is a meta-argu
ment for IililosoIilers interested in moral and
logical consistency.
It is clever, but I do
not think it is germane to the question whe
ther parental partiality justifies xenograft.
In conclusion, then, I do not think a
good parent would choose xenograft for his/
her child.
Given the fact that xenograft is
not a life-saving alternative and given a
parent's responsibility to protect his/her
child from unnecessary harm, I think a good
parent would not choose xenograft for his/her
child.
The choice of xenograft would be
immoral because it would cause unnecessary
pain and suffering for the child and unneces
sary death for the animal.
BEI'WEEN THE SPECIES
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His worry, and again it is the C01Il\l:)n one, at
least in the IililosoJ,ilical
Iililosophical literature on the
subject, is that there might not be llDral
justification 'for
for putting these
marginal
people on the human side of that intuition.
Finally, the way Nelson here expresses the
tragedy of these marginal
marginal cases--"becoming
the psychological equals of animals"--expres
ses the real motor of his intuition and his
paper:
the lives of animals are just not
worth as much as those of humans.

for their children,
children, can be needed to justify
acting on such "partial affections."
parents' acting
Toward the end of
of his
his paper, Nelson gives us
four reasons for why parents oould be llDrally
justified in seeking to have
have healthy animals
killed in
in order to donate organs for their
unhealthy children:
children:
unhealthy
this is the only way to save the child's
life,
refusing the operation may not save the
animal's life but will definitely save the
child's life,

Having analyzed Nelson's argument, let
us naw
First, consider
now evaluate it.
oonsider the
first, seoond, and fourth of Nelson's reasons
supporting xenografts.
I t is simply false
that xenografts are the only available proce
oroce
dure for saving the lives of afflicted ~ chil-
dren.
In the case of hypoplastic left heart
syndrome, there is other surgical therapy
available.
In the case of Iilarmaceuticals,
there are other ways of testing their toxici
ty.
These alternatives, as they presently
exist, !MY
may not be as reliable by themselves
as is a combination
canbination of them and animal tests,
but this is just a matter of degree, since
even with animal tests, disasters like thali
domide can occur.
Purchasing an incremental
increase in safety at the cost
oost of exploiting
millions of animals is not obviously llDrally
norally
acceptable.
Also, oontinuing to use animals
in such research and testing may actually be
an obstacle to developing and refining alter
native procedures.
Consequently, Nelson's
first oonsideration is far from weighty.

it is plausible that death is a greater
harm to the child than to the donor animal,
and
by seeking to ameliorate the condition
of animals in other areas, parents can bal
ance their special parental responsibilites
with their impartial obligations to all sen
S~1
tient beings.

Nelson's seoond reason, that the re
search animal may be killed anyway, is a case
of the coull1on excuse "if I didn't do it,
someone else would have," which is employed
by businessmen offering bribes, politicians
selling their votes, and dealers selling
Reoognizing that the
drugs to children.
Recognizing
animal may be killed anyway should lead the
"ooncerned individual" Nelson has in mind not
to stop at refusing to participate in xeno
graIilic research but to work to stop such
research, and other exploitive research, as
well.

Nelson reoognizes that these reasons could
also be cited as justification for using
severely retarded but otherwise healthy hurran
children as organ donors, but he adds that to
use such children as donors would compound
the tragedy of their having been born re
tarded, something which cannot be said of so
using healthy animals.
I think that it is instructive that
Nelson concludes
ooncludes his paper
p:iper by seeking to
close the door on using the retarded--or
other "marginal" humans--as subjects of what
appears to be clearly beneficial medical
research.
His intuition, and it is the can
mon
!IOn one, seems to be that "it is all right to
do these sorts of things to animals but not
to hurrans,
humans, " and what he is seeking in this
paper,
p:iper, and the previous one to which he al
ludes, is justification for this intuition.

Nelson's fourth reason, that refusing
the operation would not allow parents to
irrtp'U"tial obligations,
balance parental and iIllp'U'tial
is again mistaken.
Parents can pursue ful
l~ental obligations by seeking
filling their I~ental
alternative therapies and by making life as
haWY as possible for their children while
happy
they are alive.
To conclude
oonclude that
that certain
they

131

-"--,-,,,

'-~;r~-

~i,-~""ti-"

,"'"'='''''''"'':_'~~~',,,'';~i'i:ti·''.'~c:

BEI'WEEN THE SPECIES

_

~, .T,'.~'y.'T!L,t ,;;-;,"':i1,,,~&.;.~~';;4~~'~",: '~"l'_ ,,-~,_:"", ,,~,,:,-_,-,,',;,,:

'''':'';''H-;';-;-:;'"'"j§}!ij}"if5;"",,t!(~,

'E""'''':U<--''C'~

-";--'C""S'" ;"" ',,"

RESPONSE

kinds of research which might benefit one's
child would, unfortunately, involve a gross
injustice to others and, therefore, should
not be done is not to turn one's back on
his/her child.
Doing' the best for one's
child within the limitations irclp)sed by being
fair to others is one way of balancing par
ental and impartial obligations.

JIM NELSON
I am grateful to Will Aiken, Connie
Kagan, and Steve Sapontzis for their willing
ness to work through my paper with such care;
I have learned a good deal about my topic by
attending to their remarks.

The weakness of these three reasons
seems so clear when they are oonsidered in
isolation from Nelson's third reason-that
death may be a greater harm to a human than
to an animal-that it must be this third
reason which is C'.arrying the burden of proof

One thing I learned is that my paper
needs to be clearer:
I find that I am some
times taken to be making assertions when I am
actually arguing hypothetically, that I am
. taken to be making one kind of comparison
between human and non-humans when I am in
fact making quite a different comparison, and
especially, that the particular c..'Onditions
under which I am portraying xenograft as
justifialJle are misunderstood. I cannot sort
all this out in the space alotted this re
joinder, but I will try to be a bit plainer
on some of these points.

here.
However, earlier in his paper, Nelson
acknowledges that there are serious difficul
ties in trying to substantiate this claim to
greater value for human life.
He there con
cludes that this leaves us with an inconclu
sive relativism, but that is not the case.
In doing painful, lethal research with ani
mals, we are clearly adding to the burden of
suffering and exploitation in the world.
Unless this contribution to the negative side
of the !!Oral ledger can be justified, such
research ought not to be done. Consequently,
if showing that human life is !!Orally !!Ore
valuable than animal life is necessary to
meet this burden of proof and if that claim
of greater worth cannot be justified, then we
are not left with relativism; we are left
with the conclusion that we ought not to be
exploiting animals in research.

Sometimes the word "xenograft" appears
in my paper as the name of an experimental
medical procedure that occupies a place in
the actual world: this procedure is frought
with ethical difficulties of many kinds, in
large part because it has so little thera
peutic value.
At other points in my paper,
the word is used to refer to a hypothetical
procedure that has great--and in some instan
ces, unique--therapeutic value. Shifting to
this possible world allows a particular sub
set of the moral concerns occasioned by xeno
graft to arise.
It also suggests analogies
between xenograft and less recherche kinds of
medical therapies which also exploit animals.

Thus, while I do appreciate Nelson's
recognition of the !!Oral o:mplexities sur
rounding therapuetic (for humans) research
and testing which exploits animals and his
attempt to give due concern to parents and
their feelings as well as to animals and
their needs, I still think that the core
issue is that of the relative flOral worth of
animal and human life and that unless our
anthropocentric assumption that we are worth
nore than they are can be !!Orally justified,
such research with animals is L'TUll)ral and
should not be participated in by people who
are ooncerned to do what is norally right.

Thus, when Steve Sapontzis says that "it
is simply false that xenografts are the only
available procedure for saving an infant's
life," he's questioning what I'm taking to be
a stipulation; likewise, when Connie Kagan
says that "xenograft does not save chil
dren. "
I am exploring the moral dimensions
of a situation in which surgical responses to
HLHS are as inadequate as they actually are,
in which there is no cadaver which happens to
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